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 1 Introduction
There has been much research about policy instruments to overcome global warm-
ing as the \greatest market failure" of mankind (Stern, 2007). A main stand of a
successful climate policy is seen in pricing global emissions. This price signal can
be obtained by taxes or quantity instruments like emission trading schemes (ETS).
While both instruments are equivalent in an idealized world of perfect information,
the symmetry breaks down when a social planner is confronted with uncertainties
in marginal costs and marginal benets (Weitzman, 1974). Newell and Pizer (2003)
analyze the comparative advantage of price instruments over quantity instruments
for stock pollution problems like global warming. The comparative advantage of
price instruments reverses over time when damage functions become steeper due to
accumulated stock-pollutants. They conclude that in the short-run tax policies are
superior to quantity instruments; in the long-run quantity instruments are more
ecient when climate damages become more severe.
Beside these approaches where a social planner plays against the uncertainty of
nature, one of the most challenging problems seems to be the management of
intertemporal carbon pricing when owners of the exhaustible resources can act
strategically. Sinn (2008) suggests with his 'green paradox' that carbon taxes are
likely to fail to achieve socially optimal emission paths - even if such taxes are
imposed globally and, hence, cover all countries. By linking the problem of global
warming to the intertemporal extraction problem of fossil resources, he showed
within a simple Hotelling model that increasing resource taxes can lead to an ac-
celeration of resource extraction which worsens global warming. The green paradox
occurs because resource owners fear a devaluation of their resource rent by future
`green policies'. Sinn (2008) emphasizes that quantity instruments are superior to
price instruments even in a deterministic setting due to strategic behavior of the
suppliers of fossil fuels.
The work of Sinn constitutes an important change from the demand perspective to
the intertemporal supply perspective in the context of global warming. In contrast
to existing works on resource extraction and global warming that focus on a social
planner perspective (eg. Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996; Farzin, 1996) we explicitly
consider the incentive, information and rent structure of this optimization problem.
We go beyond Sinn's analysis by providing a systematic comparison of optimal
price and quantity instruments. In particular, we draw on the literature on the
intertemporal management of exhaustible resources (eg. Hotelling, 1931; Dasgupta
and Heal, 1979; Dasgupta et al., 1981) and intertemporal emissions trading (eg.
Kling and Rubin, 1997; Leiby and Rubin, 2001) when exploring designs of ecient
and eective climate policy instruments in presence of strategic behavior on the
resource supply side.
We discuss several Hotelling-like models from a social planner and decentralized
market perspective. The social planner model serves as a benchmark for the so-
cially optimal solution. In the decentralized model, we study the strategic reaction
of the resource sector that anticipates the policy instrument of the regulator and
its implication on the intertemporal resource rent. As it turns out, one crucial
2aspect for eective climate policy is the creation and distribution of dynamic eco-
nomic rents arising from increasing damages and environmental scarcities. The
main policy design decision of the regulator concerns the choice between imple-
menting a price or quantity instrument. Due to the intertemporal dynamics of the
extraction{pollution problem, the regulator usually has to commit ex ante to a tax
path or quantity path for the entire time horizon. We analyze, whether there are
instruments that require less commitment and information about optimal extrac-
tion paths for the entire time horizon. In particular, we will introduce and discuss
taxes that depend on the stock size of resource owners. Furthermore, we consider
the robustness of price and quantity instruments if (from a social perspective) sub-
optimal risk primiums are added to the discount rates. Insecure property rights
in fossil resources and incomplete future markets provoke resource owners to use a
higher eective discount rate than the representative household (eg. Sinn, 2008).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 starts with an
analysis of optimal instruments within a cost-benet analysis. Section 3 provides a
similar analysis of cost-eective instruments within a dened environmental target
{ a so-called `carbon budget' { which has high relevance for the policy arena.
Finally, we close the discussion with a brief summary of the main ndings and the
implications for the scientic debate about optimal policy instruments.
2 The Cost-Benet-Approach
The analysis in this section is based on the modied Hotelling model presented in
Sinn (2008). Production f(R) is based on the extraction of fossil resources R from
a (nite) resource stock S which can be exploited with marginal extraction costs
c(S).1 We use the common assumption that production is increasing and concave
in R, i.e. fR > 0 and fRR < 0.2 As easily accessible resource sites are exploited
rst, we assume that extraction costs rise with depletion and are convex, thus cS <
0;cSS  0. In order to focus on the supply side, we neglect decay rates of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere and carbon dioxide storage technologies. We assume
that by burning fossil resources a proportional amount of carbon dioxide is emitted
into the atmosphere and, thus, we describe damages d(S) as function of cumulative
extraction of fossil fuels. Furthermore, damages increase with the amount of carbon
in the atmosphere which is proportional to cumulative extraction, implying dS <
0. We abstract from considerations about private or social scrap values of the
resource stock in the nal period T in the business-as-usual world (without climate
damages). Irreversible and persistent damages of global warming, however, can
be considered by the social scrap value function F(S(T));FS  0 which is not
considered by individual resource owners.
In this paper, we always assume that fossil reserves are abundant in the sense that
1To improve the readibility of this paper, we will usually surpress the time-dependency of
ow and stock variables like R(t), S(t) and so on.
2In the following, we use the notation gx for the partial derivative of g with respect to x, thus:
gx :=
@g(x)
@x . Furthermore, we denote with _ g :=
dg
dt the derivative of g with respect to time.
3they are not fully extracted within the planning horizon. This can be justied by
convex marginal extraction costs (Farzin, 1992; Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996) or by
the relatively abundant resources of fossil carbon in the ground (eg. BGR, 2009)
compared to the expected consumption within the planning horizon relevant for
policy making (about some decades or one century).
Assumption 1. The stock of fossil resources is not fully extracted within the
planning horizon, i.e. S(T) > 0.
This set of assumptions helps to clarify and highlight the supply-side dynamics by
pointing out the intertemporal dimension of the control problem.
2.1 The model
2.1.1 The social planner's problem
The social planner maximizes the net present value of output f(R) minus ex-
traction costs c(S)R and damages d(S) with respect to the discount rate r. The
optimization problem with scrap value function F(S(T)) and initial resource stock





(f(R)   c(S)R   d(S))e
 rt dt + F(S(T))e
 rT (1)
subject to:
_ S =  R (2)
S(0) = S0 (3)
The solution of the intertemporal optimization problem is characterized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. (Socially optimal resource extraction) If a social planner maxi-
mizes intertemporal output according to (1{3), then:
(a) the optimal solution (R;S) is determined by the following system of equations:
r =
_ fR   dS
fR   c(S)
(4)
_ S =  R (5)
FS(S(T)) = fR(R(T))   c(S(T)) = (T) (6)
S(0) = S0 (7)







4Proof. (a) We set up the corresponding Hamiltonian funcion H = f(R) c(S)R 
d(S)   R. Application of the maximum principle then leads to the rst-order
condition with respect to R, the equation of motion for the shadow price , and
the transversality condition:
 = fR   c(S) (9)
_  = r   HS = r + cSR + dS (10)
0 = ((T)   FS(S(T)))S(T) (11)
By substituting (9) and its derivative with respect to time into (10) we obtain the
social Hotelling rule (4). Furthermore, the transversality condition (11) together
with Assumption 1 implies that (T) = FS(S(T)).







For a zero scrap value function (F(S(T))  0), Proposition 1 implies that marginal
extraction costs increase up to marginal resource productivity. If the marginal
scrap value is positive (FS(S(T)) > 0), however, resources in the ground are ad-
ditionally valued when the nal period has been reached. This may be the case
if society considers persistent and irreversible damages due to resource extraction
after the pnanning period T.
Equation (8) resembles the well-known rent dynamic for exhaustible resources
with stock-dependent extraction costs (eg. Farzin, 1992). However, the familiar
formula is extended by the term dS under the integral reecting the stock-pollutant
dynamics of resource extraction and the marginal scrap value term FS(S(T)). As
we will show below, this rent dynamic has to be reproduced by policy instruments
in order to achieve an optimal decentralized solution.
2.1.2 The decentralized resource sector's problem
The resource sector takes resource prices p(t) and resource taxes (t) as given and





(p   c(S)   )R)e
 rt dt (13)
subject to:
_ S =  R (14)
S(0) = S0 (15)
5In contrast to the social objective function (1), the resource sector does not consider
social damages due to extraction during and after the planning horizon.
By applying the maximum principle with  as shadow price for the resource stock,
we obtain (just along the lines in the proof of Proposition 1):
0 = p   c(S)       (16)
_  = r + cSR (17)
0 = (T)S(T) (18)
which leads to the private Hotelling rule and terminal condition:
r =
_ p   _  + r
p   c(S)
(19)
(T) = p(T)   c(S(T)) (20)
because S(T) > 0.
The crucial question is how to bring the private extraction dynamics in accordance
with the socially optimal extraction as described in Proposition 1. Clearly, the
social and private Hotelling rules diverge when the tax (t)  0 and marginal
damages exist. It is therefore the task of a government to tax the resource sector
such that the social and private Hotelling rules coincide, thus reproducing the
social planner equilibrium.
2.2 Optimal resource tax
By equating private and social Hotelling rule, we nd the optimal resource tax.
Proposition 2. (Optimal resource tax) If the regulator knows the socially optimal
extraction path S according to Proposition 1 and if she can commit at t = 0 to
the tax path (t) over the entire planning horizon, then










achieves the optimal extraction path;









Proof. (a) Dierentiating (21) with respect to time, we get _  = r   d
S. Substi-
tuting this into the private Hotelling rule (19) and considering the fact that in the
market equilibrium prices equal marginal productivities, i.e. p = fR, we obtain the
socially optimal Hotelling rule (4). Furthermore, (T) = FS(S(T)) ensures that
6the private transversality condition (20) equals the social transversality condition
(11).
(b) The equation for  follows from the solution of the dierential equation (17)
with (T) = 0 due to S(T) > 0.
Note that the sum of (private) resource rent  and resource tax  describes the
entire rent dynamics and is expressed by:












which is exactly the resource shadow price in the social planner model as expressed
in Eq. (8). The rst summand denotes the (cumulative) scarcity of resources due
to high stock externalities (FS(S(T)) > 0). The second summand describes the
dynamics of extraction costs and climate damages. Hence, the optimal resource tax
can be decomposed into a pure resource extraction rent  and a stock externality
rent . In the following, we will call this rent component also climate rent as it
evolves due to the stock-pollutant dynamics dS and the cumulative scarcity by
future damages expressed in (T) = FS(S(T)).
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) nd a similar result within a social planner model.
However, they use an innite time horizon and assume extraction costs that rise
without bound implying that the optimal tax converges to zero in the long run:
limT!1 (T) = 0. Within the innite time horizon, such a resource tax aims at
reallocating resource extraction, shifting it towards the future { within the nite
time horizon, it is in addition necessary to limit cumulative extraction { at least
when FS(S(T) > 0.3
Proposition 2 conrms that  in fact is incentive-compatible in a decentralized
economy as suggested by the social planner model of Hoel and Kverndokk (1996):
The tax attains that intertemporally maximizing resource owners adjust their ex-
traction path to the social optimum. However, this kind of tax requires extensive
amounts of information as well as a great ability to commit on the regulator's part,
both of which are dicult to achieve:
￿ Calculating the optimal tax requires a full assessment of social costs and
benets of fossil resource extraction from now until forever, as the regulator
has to calculate marginal damages d
S = dS(S(t)) along the entire socially
optimal resource stock path S(t).
￿ Furthermore, the regulator would have to commit to this tax for now and
forever to incentivize the resource sector correctly.
Thus, the informational and commitment requirements for the regulator are quite
unrealistic which makes deviations from the social optimum very likely. As the tax
is always positive and increasing in the beginning (Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996),
3As consideration of climate damages leads to a slower extraction (Sinn, 2008), cumulative
extraction at each point of time is lower than in the business-as-usual case.
7an incorrect tax may lead to an acceleration of extraction if the tax growth rate
is high and the initial tax level is too low (Edenhofer and Kalkuhl, 2010). Hence,
only a wrongly calculated tax could provoke Sinn's green paradox (Sinn, 2008).
2.3 Optimal stock-dependent resource taxes
Usually, regulators cannot and do not commit ex ante to a time-dependent tax path
(t) for large time horizons. Instead, regulation is more an iterative process where
the resource tax is dependent on the estimation of marginal damages from the
cumulative resource extraction. When concentrations rise, the regulator increases
the tax in order to price in higher social damages.
In this section we ask whether the regulator can achieve the optimal extraction
path by implementing a resource tax (S) which is adjusted to the current con-
centration of carbon in the atmosphere. The regulator announces explicitly how
she modulates the tax and the resource sector respomds to this tax adjustment
rule.





which depends explicitly on the cumulative amount of extracted resources S, then
(a) if there are n > 1 resource owners, the tax rule (24) leads to a steeper (at-
ter) resource price path compared to the optimal extraction if damages are convex
(concave). The private Hotelling rule is as follows:
r =







where Ri and Si denote the resource ow and stock of the i-th resource owner.
(b) The socially optimal Hotelling rule is achieved if there is only one (competetive)
resource owner. In order to meet the socially optimal transversality condition, the





The combined rent and tax dynamics is as follows:











Proof. (a) Formula (25) is derived in Appendix A.1. If damages are convex (dSS >
0), the existence of more than one resource owner (i.e.
Pn
j=1;j6=i Rj 6= 0) makes the
price path steeper compared to the socially optimal Hotelling rule. If damages are
concave (dSS < 0), the price path is attened even more and resource extraction
8becomes too conservative. Only if damages are linear in S (dSS = 0), the optimal
price path is achieved.
(b) The social optimality follows directly from Eq. (25) as
Pn
j=1;j6=i Rj = 0 for n =
1 and the private Hotelling rule equals the social Hotelling (see also Appendix A.2).
In Appendix A.2, there is also shown, that the private transversality condition
equals the socially optimal transversality condition and that the rent dynamics
follows (27).
A resource tax that is adjusted to the current resource stock suers from an ad-
ditional externality within the resource sector. If damages are convex, a high
aggregated stock S leads to a low resource tax which benets all resource owners
in the same way. Thus, if the i-th resource owner postpones extraction, all resource
owners will benet from lower resource taxes. But at the same time, he has to
extract his resources later and then he has to pay high taxes that are caused by all
resource owners together. Hence, he has an incentive to extract as fast as possible
(as long as taxes are low).
Thus, proposition 3 gives an explanation, how resource taxes lead to inecient
extraction paths and how a green paradox appears as an externality problem within
the resource sector.
There is, however, a possibility to design a stock-dependent tax on resource ex-
traction that is linked to the individual resource stock of each resource owner. At
least for s specic set of extraction functions, we can give a tax rule that achieves
the social optimum:
Proposition 4. (Individually adjusted optimal stock-dependent taxes) If there are
n identical resource owners (i.e. with the same extraction cost function and initial
resource stock) and the regulator announces to the i-th resource owner the resource



















which depends explicitly on the i-th resource owners' cumulative extraction Si,
resource owners extract along the socially optimal extraction path.
Proof. The proof is along the lines of Appendix A.2. The individual tax rule leads
for each resource owner to the Hotelling rule (cf. Eq. 106)
r =
_ p + ri(Si)
p   c(Si)
=
_ p   dS(nSi)
p   c(Si)
(30)
As all resource owners are identical, S = nSi and the social Hotelling rule (4)
follows. Furthermore, the terminal-period payment guarantees the socially optimal
transversality condition.
9The tax rule extrapolates the stock-damage caused by each resource owner's ex-
traction behavior by multiplying with factor n. Although each resource owner only
causes the fraction 1=n of social damage, he internalizes the entire stock-pollutant
dynamic as if timing and extend of the externality would only depend solely on
himself.
To conclude, increasing resource taxes dependent on the individual cumulative
resource extraction could achieve an extraction pathway according to the social
optimal time prole. In addition, the regulator does neither need to know the
optimal stock size S(t) in advance nor marginal productivity and extraction costs
of resources along the optimum. She only has to estimate the damage function and
to commit to the tax and terminal-period payment rule which determines the tax
in dependence of the individual extraction behavior. The calculation of an optimal
extraction pathway has to be carried out by the private sector. This could be seen
as advantage when the private sector's capability to perform this computation is
perceived as relatively high compared to the regulator's capability. Their huge
practical problem lies in the high transaction costs due to the dependence of the
tax rate on each rm's individual cumulative resource extraction. The regulator
would have to assess the distribution of fossil reserves between resource owners
and adjust his taxes to the individual extraction behavior. In the more realistic
case of heterogeneous resource owners, there is no simple tax rule that internalizes
the stock externality appropriately.4
2.4 Optimal emissions trading scheme
So far, we have seen that the informational requirements to implement a socially
optimal resource tax are daunting. The regulator could implement an incorrect
resource tax which could lead to the green paradox under certain circumstances
(Edenhofer and Kalkuhl, 2010). Sinn (2008) promotes a global emissions trad-
ing scheme which does not suer from the green paradox. Below, we elaborate
how an ecient emissions trading scheme (ETS) should be designed and whether
intertemporal exibility could be left to the market.
2.4.1 Emissions trading without banking and borrowing
The regulator issues in each period permits C for resource extraction. If a resource
owner wants to sell a unit of resource, he has to use one permit. Thus, the regulator
can eectively limit the resource use to C. Introducing a cap to resource extraction
restricts the resource amount that can be extracted from above. It does, however,
not imply that resource extraction always equals the permit path (as it could be
protable for resource owners to extract less than the cap allows). We do not
study the conditions under which such an undersupply of resource can occur as
4The reason is that the share of each resource owner's cumulative extraction Si on total
cumulative extraction S is in general not constant. This, however, makes it impossible to assign
the contribution of individual resource owners to global damages (as in (28)) without using
information about other resource owners' extraction paths.
10it requires quite tedious calculations. Instead, we assume that optimal extraction
under climate policy is always lower than the business-as-usual extraction:
Assumption 2. (Scarcity of permits) In each period, there are fewer permits
issued than resources extracted in the no-policy (BAU) case, i.e.
C(t) < R
BAU(t) (31)
As we will show, this assumption guarantees that all permits are used at each time
and no undersupply of resources occurs. The optimal ETS is characterized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. (Optimal ETS without banking) If the regulator issues permits
C(t) = R(t) along the socially optimal extraction path from Proposition 1, then
(a) the optimal extraction is achieved,


















Proof. (a) We have to show that all permits are used, i.e. that R(t) = C(t) =
R(t). The optimization problem of the resource sector is given by maxR
R T
0 (p  
c(S))Re rt dt subject to the constraints _ S =  R, S(0) = S0, R(t)  C(t). The
Hamiltonian function then reads H = (p c(S))R R (C R), where  denotes
the shadow price for the binding constraint R  C. Applying the maximum prin-
ciple leads to the following rst-order condition, equation of motion, transversality
and Kuhn-Tucker condition, respectively:
0 = p   c(S)       (34)
_  = r + cSR (35)
0 = (T)S(T) (36)
0 = (C   R) (37)
Assumption 1 and Eq. (36) imply that (T) = 0. Solving the dierential equation






From assumption 2 follows that R  R < RBAU and therefore S > SBAU and
cS > cBAU












r(t ) d = 
BAU(t) (39)
11With (34) we obtain  = p   c(S)    and with (16) and  = 0 (in BAU) we have
BAU = pBAU   c(SBAU). The inequality (39) therefore reads:
p   c(S)    < p
BAU   c(S
BAU) (40)
which can be rearranged to
(p   p
BAU) + c(S
BAU)   c(S) <  (41)
As p falls with higher R (because p = fR and fRR < 0) and R < RBAU it follows
p > pBAU. Likewise, SBAU < S and cS < 0 imply c(SBAU) > c(S). Therefore, (41)
leads to  > 0 and due to the Kuhn-Tucker condition (37), we have R(t) = C(t).
(b) As R follows the socially optimal path R, (32) directly follows from (38).
From (34) follows that the rent in the resource sector is given by p c(S) = +.
In particular, p(T) = c(S(T)) + (T). As R(t) = R(t) and p = fR, the dierence
p   c(S) is the same as in the social Hotelling model (9) which implies together
with (8):














Substituting  from (32) into (42), we nally obtain (33).
The shadow price  for permits exactly equals the optimal resource tax (21) and
thus reects the climate rent. It is worthwhile to note that it has been left open
which party gets the new climate rent { the resource sector or the regulator. If
the regulator issues permits for free to the resource sector, the resource sector
receives the extraction rent  and adds the user cost  to the resource price. His
rent is then given by  + . Alternatively, the regulator can sell (or auction) the
permits with a price up to  and absorb the climate rent completely. In accordance
with conventional wisdom this rent can be captured by the regulator without any
intertemporal eciency losses.
2.4.2 Emissions trading with banking and borrowing
Again, one might be tempted to argue that a regulator cannot successfully commit
herself to the optimal time path C(t) = R(t). Instead of controlling the time
path of permits, banking and borrowing on markets might allow the regulator to
leave the intertemporal timing to the markets. However, it can be shown that
a free intertemporal permit trade between periods would result in a Hotelling
path. Within this market, permits are treated like an exhaustible resource { one
permit used now is not available in the future. This Hotelling-path is not socially
optimal because the intertemporal allocation of marginal damages is not taken
into account properly (Kling and Rubin, 1997). This problem could be resolved
by introducing intertemporal trading rates. Thus, Leiby and Rubin (2001) have
calculated intertemporal trading rates (ITR) which change the eective size of
12the pollution allowance held from one period to the next and lead to an optimal
intertemporal reallocation of permits. We apply this approach to our problem in
order to prove that the regulator cannot shirk the information and commitment
problems as raised under the previous ETS without banking and borrowing.
In order to analyze banking and borrowing within our framework, only small mod-
ications are required. The objective function and equation of motion for the re-
source stock remain unchanged. However, we add an equation of motion for the
permit stock b. The permit stock decreases by one unit with one unit of resource
use and increases at rb { the intertemporal trading rate (ITR).
_ b =  R + rbb (43)
To keep our analysis simple, we restrict it to the case where the regulator issues
b0 permits only at the initial period for the entire time horizon.
As it turns out, the formula for the ITR rb is in accordance with the formula given
by Leiby and Rubin (2001). We extend their analysis by giving a formula for the
optimal size of the initial permit stock.
Proposition 6. (Optimal ETS with banking) If the regulator knows the optimal
extraction path S from Proposition 1, then
(a) she can achieve the socially optimal extraction path by issuing b0 permits in the
beginning and allowing for banking of permits with the intertemporal trading rate
rb according to:
b0 = S0 +
R T
0 e rd































Proof. See Appendix B.
In principle, optimal intertemporal permit trading requires two regulating screws.
In addition to the ITR, the regulator has to issue the optimal number of permits
in the rst period which can be traded over the entire time horizon. While the
ITR enforces the optimal timing of extraction, b0 enforces the optimal cumulative
resource consumption in accordance with the transversality condition of the social
problem. Thus, the regulator has to calculate ex ante the damages and the extrac-
tion along the social optimum dS(S(t)) and S(t), respectively. Regarding Eq.
13(44) and (45), one can get an impression of the information requirements that the
regulator as well as the market is confronted with. This result conrms the insight
which has been gained in the previous sections. So far, there is little evidence that
banking and borrowing can increase eciency within this framework or discharge
the regulator from dicult intertemporal optimization decisions by using market
mechanisms.
The ETS with banking resembles the resource rent dynamic with stock externality
as given by (8). It becomes apparent that the regulator could absorb the rent as-
sociated to the shadow price of permits . By an auctioning mechanism, she could
sell permits in the rst period at maximum price 0, which equals the discounted
value of the cumulative tax income from the optimal resource tax (21).
2.5 Comparison between price and quantity instruments
within a CBA framework
2.5.1 Suboptimal discount rates
The analysis above always assumed that the regulator has only to care about the
climate externality. Due to the intertemporal dynamic of the problem, however,
discount rates of agents and of the society play a crucial role. In particular, when
property rights for resources are insecure and capital or future markets incomplete,
agents' eective discount rate could be higher than in the representative-household
economy (eg. Sinn, 2008). Thus, policy instruments may be subject to these
secondary distortions and turn out to be suboptimal if not adjusted.
Proposition 7. (Suboptimal discount rates) If the resource sector discounts prots
with rate  which diers from the discount rate r from the social planner's problem,
then:

















(b) the eciency of the ETS without banking is not aected; the shadow price for






















In particular,  increases in  for 0  t < T.
Proof. (a) See Appendix C.1. (b) The permit path C(t) enforces the resource
14extraction path R(t) = C(t) as permits are scarce (Assumption 2). Thus, the nal
price for resources p = p(R) and the marginal extraction costs c(S) follow the










With (34) follows  = p   c(S)   . For p   c(S) we can nally substitute
the right-hand-side of Eq. (42) which gives us together with (50) the shadow price
for  with private discount rate  (49).










(t ) d > 0 (51)
as c
S < 0.
Thus, the most robust instrument against suboptimal discount rates is the ETS
without banking and borrowing. As long as the permit constraint is binding only
the user cost for permit scarcity is aected. A higher (lower) private discount
rate  > r leads only to a higher (lower) valuation of the user cost. If permits
are grandfathered, suboptimal discount rates make no dierence in nal resource
prices. If permits are auctioned, the resource sector's willingness to pay for permits
may now change to the modied user costs (t). Although suboptimal discount
rates do not change the ecient extraction path, they may lead to a slightly
dierent distribution of the climate rent.
Suboptimal discount rates in the ETS with banking and borrowing, however, are
hard to cure as they aect both intertemporal arbitrage conditions for permit as
well as resource path. In principle, a higher ITR gives an incentive to postpone
permit and resource use.
It is worthwhile to note here that a tax can in general cure both market failures.
However, the information the regulator requires for implementation are more de-
manding as in the case of an ETS without banking and borrowing: The regulator
has to consider the impact of a distorted discount rate on the entire extraction
process.
2.5.2 Assessment of price and quantity instruments
The considerations above have shown that ecient climate policy has to introduce
an additional climate rent term into the resource rent dynamic by specic policy
mechanisms. The climate rent in the cost-benet approach under each of the













Regulator ETS with auctioning;
Resource tax
Stock-dependent tax
Resource Owner ETS with grandfather-
ing
Table 1: Management and property of the climate rent within the cost-benet
approach
The complexity, however, arises due to the stock externality: For a ow pollutant,
dS  0, we observe only the classical resource rent. However, it should be noted
that all instruments have to create this climate rent irrespective how this rent is
distributed in the end. The capitalization of rents allows the optimal provision of
public goods or avoiding public bads when a limited resource can be imposed on
private rms. It is well-known in urban economics, that limited land creates a rent
which enables cities to provide an optimal amount of local public goods (Fujita
and Thisse, 2002). In principle, the same mechanism is at work in this context:
The resource tax or the direct quantity control allows for creating a rent ensuring
the optimal provision of a public good.
Tab. 1 summarizes how property and management of the climate rent can by
assigned to the regulator or to the resource owners by choosing dierent policy
instruments. Even in a world with perfect information and without transaction
costs, price and quantity instruments dier in their institutional and informational
requirements. For the stock-dependent resource tax the regulator needs only to
know the damage function but not the optimal pathway. She furthermore does
not need to commit to the entire time path of the tax but only to a rule to
adjust the tax and the terminal-period payment. For all other policy instruments,
the regulator has to calculate the optimal extraction path for the entire time
horizon and to commit to the time path of his price or quantity instrument. If
the regulator would know the socially optimal extraction path, the regulator could
control extraction directly or by an emission trading scheme without banking and
borrowing. In addition, emissions trading without banking and borrowing might
be quite eective when additional market distortions like insecure property rights,
incomplete future markets or liquidity constraints have to be taken into account.
3 The Carbon-Budget-Approach
The cost-benet-approach requires a balancing of the damages of the use of fossil
resources against the opportunity costs of postponed resource extraction. Quanti-
16fying the damages of climate change, however, is a dicult and controversial task.
It is confronted with deep uncertainties in the climate system, regional market and
non-market impacts and in normative parameters like discount rates, risk aversion
or assumed substitution possibilities between physical capital and ecosystem ser-
vices. Tipping points in the earth systems can lead to irreversible and catastrophic
impacts when certain thresholds in the temperature increase are crossed. Last but
not least, the loss of human lives and many ecosystems cannot always be quantied
reasonably well in monetary terms.
These are some of the reasons for why cost-benet-analysis for global warming is
so controversial in science and politics. In practice, however, there is a growing
consensus to limit global warming to a certain temperature limit, e.g. to two
degrees above the pre-industrialized level. As Meinshausen et al. (2009) showed
achieving such temperature limits with certain likelihood depends mainly on the
cumulative emissions until 2050. Hence, a more practical way of communicating
and negotiating climate targets could be based on (global or national) caps for
cumulated emissions { a so-called \carbon budget" (WBGU, 2009; Edenhofer et al.,
2009).
3.1 The model
The carbon budget approach, however, does not directly imply an option for a
policy instrument in order to achieve the temperature limit in a cost-eective way.
The purpose of this part is to clarify the precise requirements for the design of
policy instruments. In the following, we denote with CB the carbon budget, i.e.
the politically set cumulative amount of carbon (i.e. extracted resources) in the
atmosphere:
3.1.1 The social planner's problem
Removing the damage term and adding the budget constraint to the intertemporal








_ S =  R (54)
_ C =  R (55)
S(0) = S0 (56)
C(0) = CB (57)
Implementing a carbon budget does only make sense, if it exhibits a binding con-
straint. We formulate a similar, but more general assumption than Assumption
2:
17Assumption 3. (Scarcity of the carbon budget) Cumulative extraction in the ab-





BAU dt < S0 (58)
Proposition 8. (Socially optimal resource extraction) If a social planner maxi-
mizes intertemporal output according to (53{57), then:





_ S =  R (60)
S(0) = S0 (61)
S(T) = S0   CB (62)











T = fR(R(T))   c(S(T)) = fR(R(T))   c(S0   CB).
Proof. (a) We set up the corresponding Hamiltonian function H = f(R) c(S)R 
R   R. Applying the maximum principle leads to the following rst-order and
transversality conditions:
 +  = fR   c(S) (65)
_  = r + cSR (66)
_  = r (67)
0 = (T)S(T) (68)
0 = (T)C(T) (69)
Dierentiating (65) with respect to time and rearranging with (66) and (67), we
obtain the social Hotelling rule (59). Assumption 1 and (68) imply that (T) = 0.
As shown in the Appendix D, Assumption 3 implies that the entire budget is used
up, i.e. C(T) = 0;(T) > 0 and, hence, S(T) = S0   CB.
(b) Solving (66) with (T) = 0, we obtain (63). From (T) = 0 and (65) follows
(T) = fR(T)   c(S(T)) { and with (67) we obtain (64).
183.1.2 The decentralized resource sector's problem
As the decentralized market dynamics equals the one described in the CBA Sec. 2.1.2,
we only restate the private Hotelling rule and the terminal condition:
r =
_ p   _  + r
p   c(S)
(70)
(T) = p(T)   c(S(T)) (71)
3.2 Optimal resource tax
Proposition 9. (Optimal resource tax) If the regulator knows CB
T according to
Proposition 8 and if she can commit at t = 0 to the tax path (t) over the entire
planning horizon, then








(T))   c(S0   CB) (73)
where R(T) denotes the nal resource extraction from the social optimum (Propo-
sition 8) achieves the optimal extraction path.






Proof. (a) Plugging  from (72) and its derivative into the private Hotelling rule
(70) and utilizing that in the market equilibrium p = fR, we obtain the social
Hotelling rule (59). The transversality condition of the decentralized resource
sector (71) implies that p(T) c(S(T)) = CB
T which equals the social transversality
condition derived in Proposition 8. Hence, S(T) = S0   CB.
(b) Same proof as in Proposition 2 (b).
Hence, the regulator has to solve the social planner model in order to calculate the
initial tax level CB
T . Although the regulator could theoretically impose the correct
tax, an incorrect initial tax level or tax growth rate will lead to an exceeding or
exacerbating of the budget.
The optimal resource tax is a pure budget scarcity price that reects the scarcity
of the (exhaustible) carbon budget according to the Hotelling rule. There is only
a rent for reserves with low extraction costs which would also diminish if extrac-
tion costs were constant. Within the carbon budget approach, we call the rent
which is associated to the budget scarcity as climate rent. This rent is completely
incorporated by the resource tax.
193.3 Optimal emissions trading scheme
3.3.1 Emissions trading without banking and borrowing
The optimal intertemporal use of the carbon budget requires that permits are
issued according to the optimal resource path R from Proposition 8.
Proposition 10. (Optimal ETS without banking) If the regulator issues permits
C(t) = R(t) along the socially optimal extraction path from Proposition 8, then
(a) the optimal extraction is achieved,













(T))   c(S0   CB) (77)
Proof. The proof is basically along the lines of the proof of Proposition 5.
Proposition 10 requires that the regulator can calculate the socially optimal re-
source extraction path for the entire time horizon. She has to issue permits in each
time period according to this path.
The shadow price for permits  (which would be observed on a market for tradable
permits) equals the optimal tax in each period. Similar to the previous section
where we studied CBA compatible instruments, we denote the scarcity price for
carbon  as climate rent. The regulator could absorb this rent by auctioning
permits or she could shift this rent to resource owners by a grandfathering scheme.
3.3.2 Emissions trading with banking and borrowing
Alternatively, the regulator could allocate the permits from the carbon budget in
the rst period to the resource owners and allow for intertemporal exibility when
to use the permits. As objective function and constraints then equal the social
problem, the market reproduces the socially optimal solution.
Proposition 11. (Optimal ETS with banking) If the regulator issues CB permits
in the initial period which can be banked by resource owners, then
(a) the optimal extraction is achieved,













(T))   c(S0   CB) (80)
Proof. (a) and (b) follow directly from Proposition 8 with resource rent p (c(S)) =
 +  and  = .
20The initial permit price 0 has to be set at the level which equals cumulative permit
(=resource) demand with the carbon budget CB. As it turns out, the problem is
equivalent to the emission tax problem (72) and 0 = 0. But in contrast to the
taxation scheme, the market has to determine 0 or CB
T by estimating the demand
function and the extraction cost curve. This, however, requires a complete set of
future markets to achieve an intertemporal market equilibrium (Dasgupta and
Heal, 1979, pp. 100{110).
The regulator could issue permits for free (e.g. in a grandfathering mode to re-
source owners) or sell them at maximum price (t) { thus she can divide the
scarcity rent in a non-distortionary way between several economic actors. As the
regulator may not estimate (t) correctly, she could auction the entire permit stock
in the rst period. The rent left to the resource owner then reduces to .
3.4 Comparison between price and quantity instruments
3.4.1 Suboptimal discount rates in the resource sector
Equal to the analysis in the CBA section, we want to nd out how suboptimal
discount rates inuence the performance of the previously studied policy instrun-
ments.
Proposition 12. (Suboptimal discount rates) If the resource sector discounts prof-
its with rate  which diers from the discount rate r from the social planner's
problem and if the regulator furthermore knows the socially optimal extraction and
price paths S;R;p and CB
T from Proposition 8, then:











(b) the eciency of the ETS without banking is not aected; the shadow price for















In particular,  increases in .
(c) unter the ETS with banking the regulator has to introduce an additional resource
tax according to:







Proof. For (a) and (c) see Appendix C.2 and C.3; (b) follows basically along the
lines of the proof of Proposition 7 (b).
If the discount rate in the resource sector exceeds the social discount rate ( > r),
21the resource tax has to increase at a lower rate compared to the case where  = r
in order to provide an incentive for future extraction. Equal to the ndings in
the CBA framework, the ETS without banking and borrowing is the most robust
instrument { as long as the regulatory institution uses the 'right' discount rate.
In this case, suboptimal discount rates only aect the shadow price for permits
and, thus, the distribution of the permit rent if permits are auctioned by the
regulator. In particular, the optimal permit price does not increase exponentially
at a constant rate and is therefor not consistent with intertemporal maximization
of the permit rent. This is the reason why an ETS with banking and borrowing is
suboptimal. High discount rates of permit owners lead to a steeper permit price
path and, thus, to an accelerated extraction. Within the banking-and-borrowing
ETS, the regulator now additionally has to tax resource extraction. This, however,
requires for the regulator to have all the necessary information about optimal
timing and demand for resources for the entire time horizon. If intertemporal
markets do not perform well, the regulator cannot leave the timing decision to the
market.
3.4.2 Assessment of price and quantity instruments
With the emissions trading scheme the scarcity value of the carbon budget




(T))   c(S0   CB))e
 r(T t) (84)
is made explicit (by tax or permit price) and separated from the resource price
which covers extraction cost and an extraction cost rent .
The budget approach transforms the intertemporal resource scarcity rent into a
climate rent by imposing a cumulative budget on resource extraction. This new
scarcity rent can be distributed through permits arbitrarily and in a non-distorting
way. The resource tax mimics the permit scarcity price and implies a total transfer
of the scarcity rent to the regulator. In contrast to policy instruments in the
cost-benet-approach, the climate rent in the carbon budget does not need to be
modied by complex stock-externality dynamics as it simply follows the Hotelling
rule.
The budget approach does not require an explicit estimation of damages for given
carbon budget. In order to achieve an optimal intertemporal 'exhaustion' of the
carbon budget, extraction costs and demand for fossil resources have to be known
for the entire planning horizon.
Tab. 2 shows management and property of the climate rent for the considered
policy instruments. By issuing tradable permits with full intertemporal exibility
(free banking and borrowing), the regulator could delegate this estimation problem
to the market. An ecient market solution, however, relies on competitive markets
and the existence of functioning futures markets. As an additional market is
created by the quantity instrument, there could occur several market failures due to
competition problems, market power or information asymmetries. The functioning





ETS w/o banking and
with auctioning; Re-
source tax
ETS with banking and
auctioning
Resource Owner ETS w/o banking and
with grandfathering
ETS with banking and
grandfathering
Table 2: Management and property of the climate rent within the carbon budget
approach.
on resource, technology and capital markets (the latter is crucial for intertemporal
arbitrage decisions).The quantity instruments can be seen (by denition) as the
fool-proof instrument to achieve the carbon budget.
If the regulator sets an incorrect tax path, she could provoke cumulative extraction
higher or lower than the budget. If the regulator sets the initial tax too low and
the tax growth rate too high, she could provoke a green paradox and incentivate
resource owners to accelerate extraction compared to the no-policy case (Sinn,
2008; Edenhofer and Kalkuhl, 2010). The budget approach, however, says nothing
about how costly deviation from the budget is (e.g. due to higher damages).
4 Conclusion
From the analysis above we draw the following conclusions. First, in a deterministic
world price and quantity instruments dier with respect to the distribution of
informational requirements between market and regulator (see Tab. 1 and 2) and
their robustness against additional market failures. In particular, the cost-benet
approach has to deal with more complex intertemporal rent dynamics as the carbon
budget approach due to its aim to allocate climate damages eciently in time.
Second, due to the complexity of the stock-pollutant problem markets are hardly
able to manage the climate rent intertemporally in an ecient way. It seems to
be unavoidable to entrust a regulatory institution with the challenging task to
nd an extraction path that is `close' to the social optimum. In a cost-benet
framework, only the stock-dependent resource tax which is dependent on each
resource owner's reserve size could discharge the regulator from this task. But
the necessary condition of homogenous resource owners is highy unrealistic and,
furthermore, the implementation requires the commitment to a terminal-period
payment rule. In the carbon-budget approach, only an intertemporally exible
permit trade could dispense the regulator from nding the intertemporally ecient
extraction path. All other instruments rely crucially on the performance of the
23regulatory institution to implement an intertemporally ecient allocation plan
(see Tab. 3 for a summary).
Third, leaving the task of optimal timing to the market requires complete future
markets if the costs of misallocation are to be avoided. Until now, future markets
for commodities or resources have not been established for planning horizons of
many decades or even an entire century. Existing future markets for several decades
(e.g. for fossil resources) are often thin and suer from volatile prices due to high
uncertainties and speculations.
Forth, secondary market failures play a crucial role when discussing the robustness
of climate policy instruments. We studied the implications of suboptimal discount
rates due to insecure property rights in fossil resources, liquidity constraints in
capital markets or incomplete capital and future markets. Resource taxes can in
theory cure this additional market failure but depend on the exact assessment of
the extraction dynamic which becomes even more complex when discount rates
dier. Emissions trading schemes with intertemporal exibility may suer from
suboptimal discount rates. In particular, under a CBA approach where intertem-
poral trading rates aim to achieve an ecient re-allocation of stock-externalities,
suboptimal discount rates do not only change the timing but also the cumulative
amount of emissions. Thus, emissions become hardly controllable by the regulator.
Emissions trading schemes without intertemporal exibility about large time peri-
ods are the most robust instrument against secondary market failures in resource
and permit markets. Suboptimal discount rates do only aect the willingness to
pay for auctioned permits but do inuence neither nal resource prices nor extrac-
tion paths. The higer the risk premium (and thus, the eective discount rate) is,
the higher is the equilibrium permit price and the lower is the rent for the resource
owner.
These considerations show the need for an institution enabling a reasonable in-
tertemporal management of the climate rent which is linked to the management of
exhaustible resources. A `carbon bank' could { similar to central banks { improve
the commitment to a xed budget of permits and allow markets to nd an optimal
intertemporal pathway. However, it should be noted that this is part of a larger
discussion resembling how the division of labor between market and state should
be designed under real-world conditions (cf. Stiglitz, 1994). It is beyond this mod-
eling framework to do a meta-cost-benet analysis of these options. It is not clear
how costly the implementation of such an institution really is and whether these
costs are less than the welfare losses due to incomplete future markets.
Our analysis might suggest that emissions trading without banking and borrowing
is the least susceptible instrument when resource owners use suboptimal discount
rates. Together with the ndings of Sinn (2008) that suboptimal taxes could
worsen global warming, quantity instruments seem to be the fool-proof instru-
ment in order to achieve a certain emission path (or carbon budget). However,
this conclusion should be treated more as a hypothesis to overcome green para-
doxes than as a robust policy recommendation for real world applications. For a
robust assessment, an extension of the model in two directions is necessary. First,


















￿ regulator needs complete information
about optimal paths and damages
￿ regulator has to commit ex ante to the
entire tax path
￿ suboptimal discount rates in the re-
source sector make complex modica-
tions necessary.
Stock dependent tax:
￿ regulator does only need to know
damage function and not optimal
paths
￿ regulator has to commit to a rule how
to adjust the tax and make terminal-
period payment
￿ hard to implement due to high trans-
action costs
￿ high vulnerability to suboptimal dis-
count rates in the resource sector
￿ restrictive assumptions about re-
source sector.
Resource tax:
￿ regulator needs complete informa-
tion about optimal paths within the
carbon budget
￿ regulator has to commit ex ante to
the entire tax path
￿ suboptimal discount rates in the re-





















ETS without banking and borrowing:
￿ regulator needs complete information
about optimal paths and damages
￿ robust against suboptimal discount
rates in the resource and permit sector
ETS with banking and borrowing:
￿ regulator needs complete information
about optimal paths and damages
￿ regulator has to commit ex ante to the
optimal time-path of the intertempo-
ral trading rate
￿ intertemporal arbitrage is highly vul-
nerable to distortions linked to the
permit market (incomplete future or
capital markets)
ETS without banking and borrowing:
￿ regulator needs complete informa-
tion about optimal paths within the
carbon budget
￿ robust against suboptimal discount
rates in the resource and permit
sector
ETS with banking and borrowing:
￿ regulator needs no information
￿ market has to make entire assess-
ment about optimal Hotelling path
within carbon budget
￿ vulnerable to distortions linked to
the permit market (incomplete fu-
ture or capital markets)
￿ suboptimal discount rates make
complex modications necessary
(which diminishes informational












Complex rent dynamics due to optimal







Pure Hotelling price determined by the
scarcity of the budget:
(t) = (f(R(T))   c(S0   CB))e r(T t)
Table 3: Comparison of policy instruments
25uncertainty about costs and damages should be included. It seems reasonable to
assume that over time regulators and market agents learn more about their po-
tential to reduce mitigation costs. In addition, they will learn more on the impact
of climate change. Such an analysis, however, requires a functional description of
agent's behavior and involved uncertainties (e.g. in resource stock, damage curves,
substitutes, economic growth, discount rates etc.) which cannot be incorporated
by static marginal benet and cost curves. Thus, the Weitzman approach has to
be extended by considering the impact of uncertainties on policy instruments and
the strategic reaction that such suboptimal policy instruments provoke. Second,
additional market distortions in the markets for permits and goods need a more
careful analysis. This also includes an endogenous treatment of information asym-
metries within a principal-agent framework as a promising pathway. We assumed
that resource owners are themselves able to carry out intertemporal optimization.
However, it seems more realistic to assume that ownership and management is
separated. This could lead to a situation where the management tries to maximize
prots on the spot-market which might reverse the impact of price and quantity in-
struments on the overall time path. Taking into account these aspects might allow
for a robust assessment whether expected losses of price or quantity instruments
are greater when regulators choose wrong instruments and market participants act
strategically.
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27Appendix
A Stock-dependent Resource Taxes
A.1 Many resource owners
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i = _ p + c
i
SR
i + SR (92)








Substituting this into (91), we obtain as Hotelling rule:
r =
_ p + S
Pn
j=1;j6=i Rj
p   ci(Si)   (S)
=





For the tax rule (S) =  
dS(S)
r we nally obtain:
r =







28A.2 One (competitive) resource owner





(p   c(S)   (S))Re
 rtdt + &(S(T))e
 rT (96)
_ S =  R (97)









Hamiltonian with rst-order-conditions and transversality condition:
H = (p   c(S)   (S))R   R (101)
 = p   c(S)   (S) (102)
_  = r + cSR + SR (103)
0 = S(T)







_  = _ p + cSR + SR (105)
and substituting this into (103) and using (99) , we obtain as Hotelling rule:
r =
_ p
p   c(S)   (S)
=
_ p   dS(S)
p   c(S)
(106)
From (99), (102), (104) and S(T) > 0 (Assumption 1) follows for t = T:
p(T)   c(S(T)) = FS(S(T)) (107)

































29Hence, we obtain together with (108):











Substituting the tax rule  =  dS=r and using FS(S(T)) = (T) + (T) due
to (107) and (102), we obtain the common formula for the intertemporal rent
dynamics:










B CBA-ETS with Banking and Borrowing
The quantity trading ratio changes the eective volume of emissions through








_ S =  R (114)
_ b =  R + rbb (115)
S(0) = S0 (116)
b(0) = b0 (117)
Thus, the Hamiltonian with rst-order-conditions reads:
H = (p   c(S))R   R   (R   rbb) (118)
 = p   c(S)    (119)
_  = r + cS(S)R (120)
_  = r   rb (121)
Transversality conditions are given as follows:
S(T)(T) = 0 (122)
b(T)(T) = 0 (123)
Now, we want to derive the optimal value for b0 and the optimal policy trajectory
for rb(t) that guarantees a socially optimal solution as characterized in Proposition
1.
30B.1 Determine optimal intertemporal trading rates rb(t)
Dierentiating (119) and substituting (121), we obtain:
_  = _ p + cS(S)R   (r   rb) (124)
Equating with (120) and using (119) yields:
_ p = r(p   c(S))   rb (125)
The socially optimal price path, however, from (4) is given by:
_ p = r(p   c(S)) + dS(S) (126)
By equating (126) with (125) and using (121), we obtain:
 dS(S) = rb = r   _  (127)






























































 rsds(S)ds   1 (135)
it follows (note that (0) =  1)
e
R t











()R() d + b0

(137)
For known terminal value b(T) we can calculate b0 as follows:







() _ S() d (139)
=  b(T)(T) + (T)S(T)   (0)S(0)  
Z T
0
_ ()S() d (140)










0 e rdS(S) d + (T)e rT (142)
An optimal solution requires that (t) > 0 for t 2 [0;T] as otherwise the trading
ratio rb(T) in (131) is not dened. From the transversality condition (123) then
follows that b(T) = 0.
By substituting (T), the initial permit stock is nally described by:









0 e rdS(S) d + (T)e rT
(143)
b0 = S0 +
R T
0 e rdS(S)S d   S(T)(T)e rT
 
R T
0 e rdS(S) d + (T)e rT (144)
32B.3 Determine terminal shadow price (T)
As S(T) > 0 the transversality condition (122) implies (T) = 0 and with (119):
(T) = p(T)   c(S(T)) (145)
As in the optimum fR(R(T)) c(S(T)) = FS(S(T)) (see Proposition 1), it follows
with p = fR that:
(T) = FS(S(T)) (146)
B.4 Determine the resource rent
The rent  in the resource sector is determined by resource prices minus extraction
costs, i.e. p   c(S), and from (119) by:
 =  +  (147)
With the solution of the dierential equation for  (120) and the equation for (t)
(130), prots read:






C Suboptimal Discount Rates
C.1 Optimal resource tax in the cost-benet approach
If the resource sector uses the discount rate  instead of the socially optimal
discount rate r, the re-arranged private Hotelling rule (19) reads:
(p   c(S)) = _ p   _  +  (149)








Substituting _ p from (150) into (149), we obtain for the optimal solution:
_  =  + d

S + (r   i)(p
   c(S
)) (151)















33In order to achieve the social transversality condition (11), we set (T) = FS(S(T)).
C.2 Optimal resource tax under a carbon budget without
ETS
Under the budget approach applies the private Hotelling rule from (149). The re-
arranged socially optimal Hotelling rule (59), however, does not contain a damage
term and reads with p = fR:
r(p   c(S)) = _ p (153)
Substituting _ p from (153) into (149) and solving the ODE for given (T), we
obtain:
(t) = (T)e







In order to achieve the social transversality condition within the budget approach,
we set (T) = CB
T .
C.3 Optimal resource tax under a carbon budget with ETS
Under the ETS with banking and borrowing, we have to consider the Hotelling
rules (153) and (149) which yields to the same formula for the optimal tax as (154)
without ETS. The social transversality condition, however, is already achieved by
the limited permit stock, implying (T) = 0, and thus:







D Exhaustion of the Entire Carbon Budget
Proof for C(T) = 0 :
Let us assume, that the permit stock is not exhausted, i.e. C(T) > 0. From (69)
follows that (T) = 0 which implies that (with (T) = 0 and (65)) fR(R(T)) =
C(S(T)). As in the BAU case SB(T) > 0 and thus, B(T) = 0, it follows that
fR(RB(T)) = C(SB(T)) (where xB denotes the corresponding variable in the BAU-
scenario without the carbon budget constraint). Thus, we have:




From Assumption 3 follows that
S(T) > S
B(T) (158)
34Equations (156{158) imply together with fRR < 0 and cS < 0 that:
R(T) > R
B(T) (159)




0 R dt <
R T








  t  T (161)
In particular, this implies
R t
0 R dt <
R t















Using _ fR = fRR _ R, we get by rearranging (163) in t = t:
_ R(t

















which leads to a contradiction as the right hand side is strictly negative while the
left hand side is positive (or zero). Thus, C(T) > 0 was a false assumption and it
follows that C(T) = 0.
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